








Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act
Randolph Clarke

Let’s take it as given that we generally act freely and we’re often morally responsible for what we do when we so act. Is there such a thing as freely omitting to act or freely refraining from action, and can we be similarly responsible for omitting and refraining? One might think it obvious that the answers to these questions are affirmative; but it’s far from obvious how to understand our freedom and responsibility in such cases. 
	In this paper I’ll first examine what freely omitting or refraining might come to. Then I’ll take up the suggestion that sometimes one’s freedom in performing an action consists, in part, in being able not to act, rather than being able to act otherwise. I’ll then turn to the issue of responsibility for omitting or refraining. A question to be addressed is whether responsibility for such a thing can be basic, or whether, instead, it must derive from one’s responsibility for something else, such as a prior action. Drawing on the earlier discussion of freedom, I’ll argue in favor of the first alternative, and I’ll show that this position can be supported even given a view of responsibility that emphasizes control and the will. Finally, I’ll offer a sketch of what’s required for responsibility for omitting to act and discuss what’s needed to fill in this sketch. 

1. Omitting Freely
There are distinctly different kinds of case in which someone omits to do or refrains from doing a certain thing. And what an agent’s freedom might come to varies significantly from one kind of case to another.
	On some occasion, an agent’s not performing a certain action (e.g., not moving at all) might simply be that agent’s performing some other, incompatible action (e.g., holding very still); it might be an action designated negatively, in terms of something it isn’t. (We sometimes refer to objects in this way—“the largest non-planet directly orbiting the sun”—and we can refer in this way to actions as well.) When this is so, there’s no difficulty in seeing how one can freely omit or refrain.
	For example, when a child holds still while playing hide-and-seek, her not moving might be (identical with) her intentionally holding her body still (Clarke 2012).​[1]​ We’d then have one event—the child’s act—that can be designated with these two different expressions. In such a case, the child’s freely refraining from moving is just her freely holding still. Similar cases include some instances of speaking out (not keeping quiet), remaining standing (not sitting), and leaving (not staying).
	In another kind of case, an agent’s refraining from doing a certain thing consists in the agent’s performing some action by means of which he intentionally brings it about that he doesn’t do the thing in question. A policeman might keep his arm at his side—tensely holding it still—in order to prevent himself from shooting a fleeing suspect (Brand 1971: 45-46). The policeman’s freely refraining from shooting would consist, in part, in his freely keeping his arm at his side.
	When one decides not to do a certain thing and intentionally omits to do it, one’s freedom in not doing that thing might in part stem from one’s freely making the decision. If I intentionally omit to save a drowning child, and I do so upon deciding not to help, my freedom in omitting to help might in part stem from my freely so deciding.
	But there are cases of intentionally not doing certain things in which the agents haven’t decided not to do the things in question. Granted, intentionally not doing something requires having an intention with relevant content, such as an intention not to do that thing. And we often come to have intentions by making decisions. But that’s not the only way to come to have an intention. We make decisions when we need to settle the question what to do; but sometimes one encounters no such practical uncertainty. When it’s perfectly clear to oneself what to do, one can come to have an intention in much the same way that one comes by inference to have a belief.​[2]​ 
When, upon seeing a sign saying “Fresh Paint/Do Not Touch,” I refrain from touching a freshly painted object, I might have made no decision not to touch it. It might be that once I saw the sign, there was no question in my mind about whether to do so, no uncertainty that needed to be settled by making a decision. I simply came to intend not to touch it, and I refrained from touching it.​[3]​ Can it be that I freely refrained?
	In cases of intentionally not doing certain things, an intention with relevant content causes some of the individual’s subsequent thought and behavior (Clarke 2010). It needn’t be the case that the intention directly causes any action at all; still, it plays a crucial causal role. Indeed, the intentionality of one’s not doing a certain thing can be undermined if the causation by the intention is abnormal in a certain way, such that the agent’s control is lost.​[4]​ One aspect of freedom in intentionally not doing certain things consists in the normal causal role played by intentions in such cases. (This is so in cases in which one has decided not to do the thing in question, as well as in cases in which one has nonactively come to have the relevant intention.)
	Suppose that my coming to intend not to touch the object came about in a normal way, free from various kinds of unfreedom. I read the sign and acquired an intention not to touch the object. My coming to so intend didn’t result from delusion, compulsion, brain manipulation by neuroscientists, or anything of this sort. We may count my freedom from such things as another aspect of my freedom in refraining from touching the object.
	Suppose, further, that when I refrained from touching the freshly painted object, I was able to touch it, and to do so intentionally. And suppose that it was up to me whether I refrained from touching it or, instead, touched it. These facts constitute further respects in which an agent might be free in intentionally not doing a certain thing, even when the agent’s not doing that thing isn’t an action and doesn’t result from a decision not to do the thing in question.
	There’s nevertheless a difference between the kind of control exercised in such a case and the kind exercised in performing an intentional action. The difference is simply that, in the former case, there need be no action that is performed. In intentionally not doing a certain thing, one need not have executed any intention to act.​[5]​ (One will almost always, while awake, be intentionally performing one action or another. The point is that no such intentional action is required in the kind of case we’re considering.) 
	What of cases in which an omission isn’t intentional? Suppose that you intended to make up your mind well before the deadline whether to attend a certain conference. When the deadline rolls around, you realize that you haven’t made a decision. What might your freedom in omitting to decide come to?
	There will no doubt be numerous actions that you have performed during the relevant time. But none of these actions is your not deciding, and your freedom in doing these things isn’t your freedom in omitting to decide.
	Your omission is likely free from various kinds of unfreedom. We may suppose that you weren’t subject to insanity, phobia, hypnosis, or any such thing. This is of course an important fact about your omission.
	It might also be the case that you had a capacity to make such a decision well before the deadline, and during the relevant period you had a power to exercise that capacity. You were able to do so. This, too, seems an important respect in which you were free in omitting to decide.
	Still, the freedom of an intentional action isn’t merely the agent’s freedom from various kinds of unfreedom; and it isn’t merely a matter of one’s being able to do otherwise. It is the agent’s exercise of a certain kind of agential control in the performance of that action. (One hasn’t freely performed an intentional action unless one has, in the first place, performed an action.) In many cases of omission, there doesn’t seem to be any comparable thing.
	I’ve distinguished several kinds of case in which someone omits to do or refrains from doing a certain thing, and I’ve identified, in each kind of case, various aspects of freedom that one might have in omitting or refraining. Is there more?
	Robert Kane (1996: 35, 156) suggests that an agent can voluntarily omit to do a certain thing, and that one can be “ultimately responsible” for a voluntary omission. An action or an omission is voluntary, on Kane’s view, just in case the agent does what she wills to do, for the reasons she wills to do it, and free from compulsion and coercion. 
	It isn’t entirely clear what it is, on Kane’s view, for an action or an omission to be willed. Sometimes (e.g., 1996: 155) he characterizes it as the agent’s wanting to do that thing more than she wants to do otherwise; other times (e.g., 30) he says that it’s having reasons or motives for doing that thing that one wants to act on more than one wants to act on any others for doing otherwise. On the first reading, the want in question is simply about one’s doing a certain thing; on the second reading, it is in part about one’s reasons or motives.
	I’ll turn later to the question of whether omissions can serve as grounds of moral responsibility. Here I want to consider whether Kane’s notion of voluntariness introduces some further respect in which an omission can be free.
	One factor that Kane brings up that I haven’t mentioned is that of omitting for reasons. Elsewhere (Clarke 2010) I’ve offered a view concerning what omitting for a reason can be in cases of intentional omission. In brief, reason-states such as belief and desire cause the intentions that figure in such cases. However, in many cases of omissions that aren’t intentional, one doesn’t omit for a reason, in the normative sense of that word. When you omit to make up your mind well before the deadline, there need be no justifying or normative reason for which you so omit. If failures to act can be caused, there will likely be causes of this one; but there needn’t be any rationalizing causes of it. Hence, in a case of this sort, there’s no aspect of one’s freedom that consists in one’s omitting for reasons.
	What of the wanting more that is involved in Kane’s notion of voluntariness? He apparently has in mind motivational strength, rather than a judgment that doing a certain thing would be better than doing otherwise. But now, suppose that the policeman was strongly tempted to shoot, but he judged it better to refrain. He succeeded in doing what he judged better. If he continued to want more strongly to shoot than he wanted to do otherwise—or even to want more strongly to act on his reasons or motives for shooting than he wanted to respond to his reasons or motives for doing otherwise—this fact needn’t undermine his freedom in refraining from shooting. He might have freely overcome temptation. His refraining from shooting might have been voluntary in an ordinary sense: he omitted by design or intention, unconstrained by interference.​[6]​ Wanting more not to A, understood as Kane explains it, isn’t required for freely refraining from A-ing.​[7]​

2. Ability Not to Act
Let’s say that one acts freely just in case one exercises free will in acting. And we might say that one exercises free will in A-ing on some occasion only if one is able to do otherwise then.​[8]​
	What suffices for doing otherwise? Performing a significantly different action that is incompatible with one’s A-ing would suffice. I might do otherwise than choose to tell the truth if instead I choose to lie. But some writers appear to hold that it can suffice if one neither A-s nor performs such an incompatible action. Hugh McCann says:





Failing to choose morally or prudentially may mean making an alternative choice.... But it may also mean simply not choosing or postponing choice.... In this [latter] case, doing “otherwise” (than choosing morally) for that time period would be an omission or failure to choose rather than a choosing otherwise. (1996: 156)

Sartre was wrong, then; it isn’t always the case that “not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose” (1966: 619). But how can inactivity “count as a demonstration of my will”? And what could an ability not to act be?
	I might refrain from touching the freshly painted object without having decided not to touch it, and there might be no action—indeed, nothing at all—that is my not touching it. Still, it seems that in this case I manifest an ability to intentionally not touch the object. We have here a manifested ability not to perform an action of a certain kind, and the manifestation isn’t the performance of any action of an incompatible kind. (Though I’m not entirely inactive on this occasion—I’m standing looking at the object—I’m inactive with respect to touching it or not.) The ability that’s manifested is thus not an ability to perform an action of some kind. It is an ability not to act in a certain way.
	Can we make sense of an unmanifested ability not to act, in a case of the sort that McCann and Kane have in mind—a case of decision-making? I think we can.
	Our deliberations manifest a variety of related powers, some active and some passive. We can turn our attention to some practical question, try to think of alternatives or relevant considerations, attempt to remember various things, pursue some line of thought or switch to another, assess and weigh considerations against each other, make judgments about which reasons or alternatives are better or worse, and make decisions. Important here are certain receptive capacities: to have new considerations come to mind, to recollect, and to see implications of our thoughts. One’s success in deliberating and choosing well can turn on one’s manifesting at appropriate moments such passive powers.
	One can be inactive—albeit undergoing psychological change—in manifesting such powers. At moments during deliberation when one is actively doing something—perhaps at the moment when one makes a decision—one might have a power to instead have some new consideration come to mind. One would have been inactive in manifesting that power.
	Suppose that Carla is deliberating about whether to assist a friend in need. She has considered various factors and weighed their significance, but she’s unable to judge which alternative is better. Nevertheless, she intends to make up her mind, and at a certain moment, t, she decides to help. Suppose that there might have instead occurred to her at t some new relevant consideration, and that its occurring to her would have manifested one of her passive deliberative powers. Despite intending to make up her mind, she would not have done so at t, but the failure wouldn’t have been due to any neural glitch; it would have expressed a normal deliberative capacity.
	Imagine that Carla’s not making the decision then would have been free from various sorts of unfreedom: it wouldn’t have resulted from phobia, compulsion, direct brain manipulation by neuroscientists, etc. Perhaps we have here something that merits being called an ability not to act at a certain moment when one does act. It isn’t the mere possibility of not acting but rather a passive psychological power that is a normal constituent of deliberative capacities. (I leave aside the question of whether a manifestation of such a power is properly called a demonstration of one’s will.)
	Carla was able to do otherwise than decide at t to help: she was able to be inactive with respect to making up her mind then. Nevertheless, if Carla wasn’t able to decide at t not to help, or to decide then not to settle the matter, her freedom in making her actual decision was narrowly circumscribed. An ability not to decide might be important, but so is an ability to decide otherwise.
	Consider another case. Sue decided earlier today to attend a colloquium this afternoon. In the time since she made the decision, she’s had a vague impression that she might have forgotten a conflicting commitment. She’s made a couple of attempts to think of what she might have forgotten, but she hasn’t thought of anything, though she’s been too busy to give it a great deal of thought. Sue still intends to go to the colloquium, and now, when she notices that it’s time to go, she gets up to go.
	Imagine that what might have occurred instead, when Sue noticed the time, is that she recall the forgotten commitment. If she had, let’s suppose, the recollection would have manifested a normal psychological capacity, not some psychosis or neural glitch. And suppose that if the commitment had come to mind, Sue would have reconsidered whether to attend the colloquium. She would have been able to go, and able instead to change her mind and keep her prior commitment.​[9]​
	A kind of ability not to act at some moment might be, as in this case, an important aspect of one’s freely performing an action. The manifestation of that ability might be necessary for one’s acting otherwise shortly afterwards. (Sue’s recalling the forgotten commitment might have been necessary, not for her having been able to perform an action incompatible with getting up to go, but for her exercising that ability.) A passive power to do something other than act at a certain moment might thus be a valuable partner of an ability to act otherwise a moment later. 

3. Basic Responsibility
In section 1 I examined what an agent’s freedom in omitting or refraining might come to. I move now to the topic of moral responsibility. I’ll begin with a familiar distinction.
	Sometimes someone is morally responsible for something because that thing results from something else for which that individual is responsible. A parent might be blameworthy for the death of a child because the child’s death resulted from abuse by the parent and the parent is blameworthy for abusing the child. Responsibility for such things, I’ll say, is derived or non-basic, and the parent is indirectly responsible for the death. Our responsibility for outcomes of our actions, when those outcomes are not themselves our actions, is commonly derived.
	Some of one’s actions are consequences of one’s earlier actions. And responsibility for such a resulting action can be derived. A heroin addict might be responsible for injecting herself with the drug on some occasion even if she can’t reasonably be expected to resist her urge to do so. Her responsibility would at least in part stem from her responsibility for prior actions of hers that resulted in her addiction and thus in her behavior on this occasion.
	But not all of our moral responsibility is derived, or not solely so. Sometimes one is responsible for something and one’s responsibility for that thing doesn’t entirely stem from one’s responsibility for something else. Responsibility for that thing is then, at least in part, basic. I’ll say that in such a case the agent is, at least in part, directly responsible for that thing.
	Responsibility for an action can be in part derived and in part basic. One might be responsible for that action partly because it results—by way of some of one’s traits, habits, beliefs, or desires that also result—from one’s prior actions, and partly independently of the fact that it so results, in virtue of one’s freely performing that action.
	We can be indirectly responsible for various kinds of thing: actions, omissions, habits and character traits, psychological states such as belief, desire, and intention, episodes of emotion such as anger or hatred, and outcomes not involving ourselves, such as the suffering or death of another person. For what kinds of thing can we be, at least in part, directly responsible?
	It’s commonly recognized that free actions, or some kinds of them, are included. And it’s sometimes said that it’s only for free actions, or only for some kinds of them, that agents can be directly responsible.
	Kane appears to hold a view of this kind. As do many theorists, he takes responsibility to require freedom. And with respect to the latter, he endorses what he calls Bramhall’s Thesis: “The freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will” (1996: 124).​[10]​ We’re free in a non-derivative way, he holds, only in the case of “self-forming willings,” which “include such things as choices, decisions, judgments, formations of intention, and efforts or trying, all of which are mental ‘acts’ or actions of one sort or another” (125).​[11]​ As these acts of will are the source of our freedom, so they ground our moral responsibility.
	At least part of what motivates such views, I suspect, is adherence to a Kantian principle according to which moral worth depends solely on the good will. Thomas Nagel finds a reflection of this principle in our ordinary moral thinking, in the idea that “people cannot be morally assessed for...what is due to factors beyond their control” (1979: 25). We might be thought to directly control, in the required manner, only our free acts of will. Whether such acts result in anything else depends, at least to some extent, on luck. On such a view, our basic, underived responsibility is only for these willings. Our responsibility for anything else traces back to our responsibility for these acts of will.

4. Responsibility for Omissions
What should we say, then, about moral responsibility for omissions? If the child playing hide-and-seek is responsible, by way of responsibility for some act of will, for holding very still, then she might in the same way be responsible for not moving. If there is some act of will involved when the policeman keeps his arm at his side, his responsibility for refraining from shooting might derive from his responsibility for this act of will. When one decides not to do a certain thing and then intentionally omits to do it, one’s responsibility for the omission might, at least in part, stem from one’s responsibility for freely deciding not to do that thing.​[12]​
	We saw that when I refrain from touching the newly painted object, I need not have decided not to touch it, and there need be no action at all that is my not touching it. Nevertheless I might freely refrain from touching it. And it certainly seems that I can be responsible—perhaps praiseworthy—for not touching the object and messing up the paint job. In this case, it seems, we might have something—an intentional omission or a refraining—that isn’t an action of any kind and for which one can be directly responsible. A restriction of basic responsibility to acts of will—or even to actions of some broader kind—is thus mistaken.
	What about cases in which an omission isn’t intentional? Suppose that I planned to stop and buy milk on the way home, but I forgot to do so. I didn’t intentionally omit to stop and buy milk. Perhaps earlier I had decided to make the stop, but I’m blameless for that act of decision making, and surely any blame I’m due for failing to get the milk doesn’t derive from my responsibility for that earlier decision.
	While driving home, I started to think about omissions; if I hadn’t, my earlier decision to stop and get milk would have caused my doing so. Perhaps my responsibility for failing to get the milk derives from responsibility for this mental act.
	The trouble with this suggestion is that, we may imagine, I didn’t foresee that the failure would result from my thinking about omissions. And the case is easily imagined such that it isn’t plausible that I should have foreseen this. I routinely think about my work while driving home, typically without untoward consequences. It’s not that I should have refrained from thinking about omissions; what I should have done is get the milk.
	Similarly, we may suppose that my responsibility for omitting to get the milk can’t be traced back to my responsibility for earlier actions that resulted in my having a poor memory. I don’t have a poor memory, just an average one. And we may imagine that in performing earlier actions I didn’t foresee, and it can’t plausibly be said that when I performed them I should have foreseen, that they would result in my becoming the sort of person who would forget what I planned to do on occasions like this. 
	Perhaps I should have made myself a note or created a reminder on my phone. But my omission to do these things, too, we may imagine, wasn’t intentional. And if responsibility for such an omission can’t be basic, we face the same difficulty in finding something my responsibility for which grounds my responsibility for these omissions.
	The crux of the matter is that some epistemic (or better, cognitive) condition must be met when responsibility for something derives from responsibility for prior actions. One must have foreseen, or it must be that one should have foreseen, that the outcome would or was likely to ensue. In many cases of omissions that aren’t intentional, it seems, this cognitive requirement isn’t satisfied. It thus appears that if responsibility for such omissions can’t be basic, then there’s considerably less responsibility for omissions than we generally think.
	We might take it as a moral datum—one that a theory of responsibility should fit, and perhaps ought to explain—that we’re commonly responsible for omissions, and often for omissions that aren’t intentional. A view on which this can’t be so convicts very many of our everyday moral judgments of falsehood. A view that saves more of the phenomena is in an important respect preferable.
	But a more conservative view might be thought to conflict with the Kantian principle mentioned earlier. It might appear that where there’s no willing—and, indeed, no intention— there’s no bad will. Is there no way of accepting our everyday judgments without rejecting what seems right about the Kantian principle? 

5. Moral Assessability
Several writers on moral responsibility distinguish a kind or aspect of it that they call attributability. An individual bears such responsibility for all that can appropriately be taken as a basis of moral assessment of her. The things in question are those that reflect one’s evaluative judgments or disclose one’s practical commitments. Our answerability for such things is a matter of its making sense that we be asked to defend them, to provide our justifications of them.​[13]​
	Writers taking this view sometimes argue that there’s no special role for action in grounding moral responsibility. One can be appropriately morally assessed for feeling envious, for holding an uncharitable belief, or for forgetting a friend’s birthday.​[14]​ Such things reflect one’s evaluative judgments or practical commitments, and one can be asked to justify them, and to offer excuse or apology if one can’t.
There’s no problem fitting basic responsibility for omitting to act—even when the omission isn’t intentional—into such a view. For a failure to act, too, can reflect a lack of concern. One can be asked to justify such a thing, and one can be expected to apologize if one lacks justification or excuse.
	However, it seems to me that there’s a kind of moral assessability that’s more closely tied than is attributability (of the sort just described) to certain other aspects of our practice of finding and holding people responsible. And it appears that omitting to act, along with action, might play a special role with regard to assessability of this second kind, in a way that respects the Kantian principle.
	Sometimes when someone is negatively morally assessable for something, it’s appropriate to have toward that person one or another of a certain class of reactive attitudes that are closely tied to finding someone responsible, attitudes including resentment, indignation, and (when the offender is oneself) guilt. You might appropriately judge a colleague blameworthy and feel resentment when you discover that she has deceived you about an important matter.
	In other cases of appropriate negative assessment, such attitudes are out of place. Imagine (an example from Watson 2004a: 19) “a squash player who, while suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the face with the racquet.”​[15]​ Even if the angry player gets a grip on himself and dismisses his desire without acting on it, some judgment of moral failing, and some not-entirely-cognitive attitude toward him, will be fitting. But something like distaste or distrust—or perhaps amusement—is what would fit. Indignation toward him is out of place.
	Resentment, indignation, and guilt reflect the sort of demand that can appropriately be made with regard to action, one that can be grounded in moral obligation. We’re morally obligated to act or not act in certain ways, and because we are, we can appropriately demand of one another (and ourselves) that we act in ways that manifest goodwill, or at least don’t manifest ill will, and that we not act in ways that manifest the latter. The attitudes in question are often apt responses to failures to meet such a demand.​[16]​ In contrast, although coming to desire to do something that one is obligated not to do can manifest a moral flaw, one doesn’t violate a moral obligation simply in coming to have the desire. Cases of derived responsibility aside, attitudes that can appropriately accompany assessments for having such non-voluntary attitudes don’t reflect the kind of demand that’s reflected in resentment, indignation, and guilt.
	Similarly, one’s assessability for actions is tied to the justification of sanctions in a way that assessability for having non-voluntary attitudes is not. One can merit an overt response meant as a sanction when one has freely acted wrongly. Merely desiring to do something that one ought not do can merit some kind of overt response, even one that costs the offender, but not, I think, one that is meant as administering a sanction. Again, the difference seems due to a difference in the applicability of moral obligation. Some sanctioning behavior, it seems, can be merited only by violations of obligation.
	It thus appears that there’s a kind of moral assessability with respect to which actions play a role that isn’t played by non-voluntary states of mind. This is a kind of assessability that concerns whether one has acted appropriately in response to moral obligations. Might omissions play a similar role with respect to this kind of moral assessability?
	In many cases of omission, there’s no action that is the omission, and there’s no decision to omit. Still, in some such cases, one complies with an obligation simply by omitting to do a certain thing. Moral obligation is often simply a requirement that one not do anything of some kind; it’s commonly indifferent to what, when not doing that thing, one does do. I might comply with an obligation—an obligation not to ruin the paint job—simply by not touching the freshly painted object. I might merit a favorable moral assessment for doing so. The demand that I not manifest active ill will is satisfied simply by my refraining from touching the object. No action is required.
	Further, often when in omitting to do a certain thing one fails to fulfill an obligation, one’s failure is one that was avoidable simply by performing the action in question. If I had promised to stop and get milk and was thereby obligated to do so, all I had to do to fulfill the obligation—and to satisfy the demand that I manifest proper regard for the person to whom I’d made the promise—was get the milk. In contrast, any obligation one might have to avoid having bad desires would be an obligation to act so as to prevent one’s having them (or not act so as to bring them about). Obligation applies in a more direct way to omitting to act than it does to non-voluntary states.
	Earlier I indicated several respects in which omitting to act can be free. When one intentionally omits to do something, even when one hasn’t decided not to do that thing, an aspect of one’s freedom consists in the normal causal role played by one’s intention in producing some of one’s subsequent thought and behavior. Further, one’s coming to have that intention will commonly be free from various kinds of unfreedom. When one refrains after deciding not to do a certain thing, one’s decision will typically have been free. And ordinarily one will have been able to perform the action that in fact one omitted. In cases of omissions that aren’t intentional, commonly one’s thinking or doing what one actually did will be free from various sorts of unfreedom, and one will have been able to do what one omitted. In many of these cases, one doesn’t exercise the agential control that is exercised in action, but one has a kind of control that shares several features with such agential control.
	Of course, omissions that aren’t intentional are typically unwitting: one isn’t aware that one isn’t doing the thing in question. Indeed, commonly in such cases one wasn’t aware at any earlier time that one wasn’t going to do the thing. The Kantian principle is sometimes understood as requiring some such awareness.​[17]​ But the quality of one’s will can be reflected not just in what one knowingly wills; it can be reflected in a failure to will. Even unwitting failures to will, then, might play a role in grounding responsibility that isn’t played by non-voluntary states such as desire. We have a kind of control over the former that we lack over the latter.
	Note that it would be mistaken to think that, when I omit to get the milk, I’m unable to do so because I’ve forgotten my plan. Recalling my intention might be required for the exercise of my ability, but it isn’t required for being able. Forgetting to do something isn’t disabling. Indeed, it would be fair to say that it remains up to me whether I get the milk.

6. A Proposal
It’s commonly thought that, in addition to having free will, being morally responsible requires having a capacity to recognize and respond to specifically moral reasons. Let’s confine our attention to agents who have this capacity. What’s needed for them to be directly responsible for omitting to do or refraining from doing certain things? 
Consider the following proposal: such an agent is directly morally responsible for omitting to A on some occasion just in case she freely omits to A then.
	The proposal is at best the skeleton of a correct view. I’ve suggested several factors that might constitute one’s freedom in omitting or refraining, including: freely deciding not to do the thing in question, or being free from various kinds of unfreedom in nonactively coming to have one’s intention; the normal causal role played by an intention one has; and being able to perform the omitted action. The suggestions are adaptations of off-the-shelf components of familiar accounts of free action. An informative proposal would have to spell out these suggestions more fully than I’ve done here.
	Moreover, as it stands the proposal doesn’t say whether all of the suggested factors, or only some, are required for basic responsibility for not doing a certain thing. We might wonder, in particular, whether an ability to do that thing is required.
	Note that an inability to do a certain thing can preclude one’s not doing that thing on some occasion from counting as an omission or an instance of refraining.​[18]​ I haven’t omitted to buy milk at the store if, whether I know it or not, the store is out of milk. (I might have omitted to stop at the store or to try to buy milk, but that’s another matter.)
	Nevertheless, even when, due to lack of an ability, an agent’s not doing a certain thing doesn’t count as an omission or an instance of refraining, there can still be a question of whether the agent is responsible for not doing that thing, and indeed she can be. If I’m unable today to go to the store and get milk because my car won’t start, and my car won’t start today because I left its lights on yesterday evening, I might be responsible for not getting milk.
	In this case, it appears, my responsibility for not getting the milk derives from my responsibility for leaving the car lights on. Hence there’s no reason here to think that ability to do a certain thing isn’t required for basic responsibility for not doing it. But we’ll need to consider whether there’s any such reason elsewhere.​[19]​
	The proposal also says nothing explicitly about cognitive requirements for responsibility. Though I’ve suggested there might be cases of basic responsibility for unwitting omissions, I mean to leave this question open. Hence as it stands the proposal doesn’t say whether awareness that one isn’t doing a certain thing (or earlier awareness that one isn’t going to do it) is part of the required freedom.​[20]​
	There might be an epistemic or cognitive requirement for responsibility that is additional to the requirement of freedom, as some authors maintain.​[21]​ If there is, and if the requirement applies even to basic responsibility, then the proposal may need to be revised accordingly. I won’t attempt to work out exactly what this further requirement, if there is one, comes to.













^1	 . The example comes from Mele (1997: 232), who uses it for a different purpose. Lest one think that holding very still can’t be an intentional action, imagine the child crouching behind a sofa for several minutes to keep from being seen. Remaining in that position requires maintaining balance, making repeated adjustments of muscle tension in response to feedback, all resulting from the child’s intending, over the period in question, to remain very still.
^2	 2.  For support of these claims, see Audi 1993: 64 and Mele 1992: 231.
^3	 3. I take it that at least typically when one refrains from doing a certain thing, one intentionally doesn’t do that thing. The case at hand would be one of my intentionally not touching the object.  
^4	 4. Imagine that one’s coming to intend not to get out of bed triggers—immediately and unexpectedly—a prolonged narcoleptic episode. Though one doesn’t get up, one doesn’t intentionally not get up. 
^5	 5. One will have had some intention, and that intention will have caused something. But the intention need not have been an intention to perform an action of any kind, and what’s required with respect to intention’s causal role is much less in a case of refraining than it is in intentional action. For more on this point, see Clarke 2010.
^6	 . Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1987).
^7	 7. Throughout the paper I’ll use ‘A’, ‘A-s’, and ‘A-ing’ as stand-ins for expressions indicating types of action.
^8	 . Note that ‘freely’ and ‘free will’ are sometimes used to express a requirement for moral responsibility. It’s an open question whether that requirement includes an ability to do otherwise. Hence, when ‘free will’ is used as I suggest in the text here, it’s an open question whether free will is a requirement for moral responsibility. 
^9	 . I discuss this example in Clarke 2000.
^10	 . For Bramhall’s statement of this view, see his response to Hobbes in Chappell 1999: 44.
^11	 11. Kane subsequently adds to this list certain “voluntary omissions” (1996: 156), though, as I’ve noted, in many cases an omission isn’t an action of any kind at all.
^12	 12. If basic responsibility is limited to acts of will, then in none of these cases will responsibility for an omission or for refraining count as basic. But then, on this view of basic responsibility, the same goes for most actions—raising one’s arm, walking to the library, driving a car, etc. On a more liberal view that allows for basic responsibility for more kinds of action, the child’s responsibility for not moving might count as basic.
^13	 . See, for example, Scanlon 1998: ch. 6; Smith 2005; and Watson 2004b. 
^14	 . Smith (2005) emphasizes this point.
^15	 . Watson employs the case for a different purpose.
^16	 . “The personal reactive attitudes [such as resentment] rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of other human beings towards ourselves; or at least on the expectation of, and demand for, an absence of the manifestation of active ill will or indifferent disregard.... The generalized or vicarious analogues of the personal reactive attitudes [such as indignation] rest on, and reflect, exactly the same expectation or demand in a generalized form; they rest on, or reflect, that is, the demand for the manifestation of a reasonable degree of goodwill or regard, on the part of others, not simply towards oneself, but towards all those on whose behalf moral indignation may be felt, i.e. as we now think, towards all men” (Strawson 2003: 84). 
^17	 . Sher (2009) construes it this way and argues against it.
^18	 18. There are different kinds of ability to act, and hence inabilities are of several kinds. Not every kind of inability precludes one’s not doing a certain thing from counting as omitting or refraining. I develop this point in Clarke forthcoming: ch. 4.
^19	 . Frankfurt omission cases might be thought to show that an ability to do the omitted thing isn’t required for responsibility. For discussion see Clarke 2011; Fischer and Ravizza 1998: ch. 5; Frankfurt 1994; McIntyre 1994; and Sartorio 2005. 
^20	 . Intentionally omitting to do a certain thing might itself require something with respect to awareness. However, intentionally omitting to A at t doesn’t require that one be aware at t that one isn’t A-ing. I might intentionally omit to attend a conference in May if I decide in January not to go and in May I’m no longer thinking about the matter. Indeed, I might intentionally omit to meet you at the airport at midnight even if I’m asleep at midnight. But generally in either case I’ll have been aware earlier that I’m not going to do the thing in question. If intentionally omitting requires awareness, intentionally omitting freely does.
^21	 . See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 12-13; Ginet 2000; and (for the most thorough treatment of this issue) Sher 2009.
^22	 . I want to express my appreciation to Bob Kane for the many significant contributions he’s made to philosophical discussion of free will, and for the support and encouragement he’s given me. For comments on earlier versions of this paper, thanks to Keren Gorodeisky, Emese Mogyoródi, Dana Nelkin, David Palmer, Ian Proops, Carolina Sartorio, and Susan Wolf, and to audiences at Seoul National University, the 2012 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, and the January 2013 Big Questions in Free Will Conference. Work on the paper was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.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